“Highly contagious bird flu virus detected in dairy cows in Texas and Kansas.” » “Bird flu was detected in a dairy worker.” "First human case of bird flu in Texas raises concerns." Could this be how the next pandemic will begin? Well, so far, U.S. officials say they believe the risk to the public from the latest wave of bird flu is minimal.
But with evidence accumulating of potential mammal-to-mammal spread just weeks after the discovery of a new avian flu in cows, many of us in the biosecurity and conservation community pandemic preparedness believe that leaders in capitals around the world must work to anticipate this situation. A new threat to public health if the H5N1 influenza virus acquires the ability to spread between humans.
Cases of transmission to humans have also been documented: earlier this month, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced that another person in the United States had tested positive for avian flu. The first human case of H5N1 in the United States occurred in 2022, involving a poultry worker in Colorado, and the most recent case involved a dairy worker who had direct contact with infected livestock in Texas. Both human cases had mild symptoms and were treated and fully recovered, but previous cases of bird flu in other parts of the world were much more severe, resulting in death in several cases. What we don't know – and what worries scientists – is whether the virus will evolve in a way that allows it to spread more easily between humans.
In March, the first case of H5N1 virus infection in cattle was reported and, although direct cow-to-cow transmission has not been confirmed, the emergence of cases in cattle in at least six states suggests that cows can transmit the influenza virus directly between cows. themselves during transport to different farms, rather than infecting sick birds.
An unconscious white chicken waiting to be slaughtered, Heart Elk Lake, Wisconsin, USA
As we face uncertainty about what will happen next, many scientists say intense government action is warranted because of the risk of bird flu becoming a pandemic. Many researchers believe that Covid-19 may have started in a similar way, jumping from animals to humans by acquiring the ability to spread between mammals that came into contact with humans, then evolving to transmit directly between humans.
The United States and other governments around the world must take the H5N1 virus seriously and demonstrate that we have learned the lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic that has disrupted our lives for years. They should take immediate steps to overcome these risks rather than taking a wait-and-see approach.
In the short term, governments must act now to deploy their capabilities to prevent the uncontrolled spread of the H5N1 avian influenza virus if it spreads to humans. This includes funding research into vaccines most likely to be effective against the virus, improving livestock and human surveillance, and broader emergency response planning.
It is encouraging to learn that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has strengthened surveillance systems and supported testing of potential vaccine candidates that may be more effective against this strain of avian flu than currently limited supplies of the H5N1 vaccine developed for many years. There is. Since.
Moving forward, it will be critical for the human and animal health sectors, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the USDA, to work together on biological surveillance, including developing a joint approach to monitoring human populations and animals and share data. in order to follow the evolution of the virus.
Additionally, if the U.S. government can identify an effective vaccine against the new avian flu, it will be important to put plans in place to produce the vaccine quickly, so that it is ready for use if needed. Additionally, the United States and other governments must consider how to update and act on their pandemic influenza response plans if H5N1 begins to spread among humans.
To prepare for a possible outbreak of bird flu, governments around the world must take these steps now, even in the face of uncertainty. If they wait for the disease to spread among people, it will be very difficult to prevent the uncontrolled spread of the virus.
It is also time to reassess the long term and ensure that countries around the world have the capacity to detect and respond to future epidemics and pandemics. According to the Global Health Security Index, there are significant gaps in countries' capacities to prepare for epidemics.
During the COVID pandemic, we have seen first-hand that capacity matters when it comes to saving lives. According to a study published last year by experts from the Brown University Center for Epidemiology, the Gates Foundation and the NTI Institute, all countries that had strong pandemic preparedness capacity at the start of Covid had lower mortality rates than less prepared countries.
A wide range of capabilities have proven effective, including disease detection systems, medical countermeasure delivery systems, and public health infrastructure for the deployment of non-pharmaceutical interventions.
Playing the long game means investing now to ensure countries have the capabilities they need to respond to the worst of the H5N1 pandemic or prepare for the next one. Given the impact of COVID, it is deeply disappointing that national governments are not investing the resources needed to build pandemic preparedness capabilities that could save lives. It does not mean anything.
In the United States, federal funding to combat pandemic influenza falls far short of what is needed to effectively address this threat. Government experts have called for $1.15 billion in funding for the 2025 flu pandemic, but the Biden administration has requested only $335 million. To make matters worse, Congress has slashed funding for pandemic preparedness as part of the ongoing appropriations process.
This is also an international problem. Most countries – even those with sufficient resources – have not invested financially in strengthening pandemic preparedness. The 2021 Global Health Security Index — which measures pandemic preparedness capacity at the national level and was developed collaboratively by NTI and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and Economic Impact — found that 155 countries out of 195 had not allocated funds in the last three years. improve capacity (except in public health emergencies) to respond to pandemic threats.
The White House just announced a new global health security strategy, which includes a commitment to working with 50 countries to strengthen pandemic preparedness capabilities. This is a big step in the right direction, but the U.S. government and its partners will need to ensure they have the financial resources and political will to deliver on this commitment.
Playing the long game also means supporting the World Bank's Pandemic Fund, designed to invest in the long-term capacity of low- and middle-income countries to prepare for pandemics. The Fund has received $1.9 billion in pledged resources from national governments, philanthropies and other groups, but it provides grants to support valuable capacity-building efforts and will soon run out of money. Experts estimate that around $10 billion a year will be needed for at least five years to provide funding that will allow countries to strengthen their infectious disease detection and response capabilities, needed to protect against pandemics. We must do better.
Covid has highlighted the dangers of the pandemic and, sadly, in many parts of the world we have witnessed its deadly consequences. Governments must act quickly and decisively now to overcome the growing public health threat posed by te H5N1 flu, while investing in long-term capacity building to ensure the world is better prepared for the next pandemic.